Award: GEO-1211972

Fisheries provide income and food for millions of people around the world and their management has been a topic of intense study for decades. Fisheries need some form of management because they suffer from the tragedy of the commons, where if the conditions are right, it is in every individual fisher?s best interest to deplete the resource. Solutions to this tragedy exist, and most rely on strong enforcement of laws so that over harvesting is avoided. The challenge is that in many places, strong enforcement is just not available, and alternative forms of governance are needed. These alternatives typically focus on incentivizing sustainable behaviors amongst fishers. However, fisheries are comprised of lots of different kinds of people, each with their own motivations. Furthermore, there are large differences between fisheries in terms of the equipment fishers use, and the rules that they have to follow. For these reasons, it remains a challenge to incentivize sustainable behaviors. We performed research to identify the major drivers of fisher behavior, to better understand how to incentivize sustainable practices. We developed a multi-pronged approach that included synthesizing and analyzing large amounts of data, developing computer-based simulations and mathematical models. More specifically, to mirror ecological studies of flocks of birds and/or schools of fish, we collected location data of fishers on the US west coast. This was done in collaboration with researchers at NOAA, and involved synthesizing Vessel Monitoring Data (VMS). VMS data includes the spatial location of a fishing vessel through time, and we synthesized these data for over 1000 vessels on the US west-coast, spanning 5 years. With these data we were able to identify that certain fishers follow fronts, and others don?t. This helped us conclude that the condition of the ocean itself can determine the spatial behavior of fishers. We also used the west-coast fisheries data to construct estimates of "fisheries connectivity" which is a measure for how connected different fisheries are based upon shared participation by fishers. For example, in Newport, Oregon, a tuna fisher will likely work in the salmon fishery at some point in the year. This connects these two fisheries. Conversely, he/she is unlikely to work in the pink shrimp fishery, and hence the tuna and shrimp fisheries are unconnected. The importance of quantifying fisheries connectivity for coastal communities all along the US west-coast is that is provides a measure of how well these fishing communities might adapt to bad years. For example, if the tuna fishing isn?t great, this fisher could still make money from the salmon fishery. In tandem with these analyses of fisheries data, we developed and mathematically analyzed an agent-based model of fishers and fish. This agent-based model simulated the movements of fishers, and allowed us to fully explore how different search behavior impact income. We focused on identifying when fishers share information about the location of fish, and how different forms of management change outcomes. Through collaboration with researchers in Germany, we expanded this work, and showed how different cooperative and antisocial behaviors can emerge in different fisheries. We also developed game theoretic models that identified the economic conditions for when fisheries cooperatives persist over time; we found that "second-best" decisions, where resources are sub-optimally exploited, are often better than the social "first-best" decision. In another study, we employed computational tools from evolutionary biology to understand when revenue sharing "risk pools" can exist in marine communities. They are known to exist in a few systems around the world, but little theory has been dedicated to understand how and when they form. Our work on risk-pools led to a paper on how insurance can be used to help foster cooperatives in fisheries and aquaculture. Last, we provided a review of key Complex Adaptive Systems concepts relevant to marine systems, those being emergent patterns, critical transitions, and public goods. In addition, novel mathematical theory was developed to understand when human communities evolve pro-social preferences for collective action. These results are applicable to marine systems, but also to other common-pool resource problems, such as global climate change. In addition, we investigated the role of incentives in emerging ocean sustainability in coupled human and environmental systems. This work provided a detailed overview of how individual incentives are key to developing sustainable fisheries and marine industries more broadly. In sum, all the work described above is important for the following reasons: 1) we now know more about the biological and technological conditions required for cooperation to emerge amongst fishers and 2) given cooperation amongst fishers, we have a better understanding for how incentives can be created for long-term sustainable use of environmental resources. Last Modified: 10/15/2018 Submitted by: Simon A Levin